Segregation An “Impractical” Luxury: School Desegregation in Brownwood

“We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” – Chief Justice Earl Warren May 17, 1954

Written by Carl Bodiford – The post-World War II years presented significant challenges for the community of Brownwood. Education loomed among the top concerns. Neglected school plants were in need of repair and modernization. In addition, greater oversight from the State Board of Education forced the school district to increase the number of teachers and their salaries as well. School Superintendent James D. King and the members of the School Board recognized the need to prioritize expenditures and reduce costs wherever possible. Despite pressure from powerful segregationist leaders in the state, in the summer of 1955, these men took a bold step by beginning the process of school desegregation as a means to better provide for the benefit of all the students of Brownwood.

Brownwood School Superintendent James D. King

On May 31, 1955, the Supreme Court handed down the Brown II decision which stated that the original decision given the previous May should be implemented with “… all deliberate speed.” While most school districts took full advantage of the general nature of the order and procrastinated, Brownwood and sixty – two other Texas school districts made plans for some type of school integration in the fall of 1955. The districts that began desegregation at this early juncture had one similarity – a low African-American student population.

With the exception of Eagle Mountain I.S.D. north of Fort Worth and Waco, all of the districts that planned to begin integration in the fall of 1955 were located in west or southwest Texas. The African–American student population in these districts in 1954 averaged around four per cent of the total school population while African–American student populations in the eastern and the southeastern school districts averaged around twenty per cent. The Brownwood African–American population in fact declined as a portion of the total student population from 5.3% in 1950 to 3.8% in 1954. During this short interval, the total school population at Hardin School decreased by 26.8% from 157 to 115 while the population at all white campuses in Brownwood had increased marginally by 3.4% from 2,797 to 2,893.

The rising relative cost of the maintenance of “Jim Crow” segregation at Hardin School was all too evident to the bottom–line oriented school administrators. The illusion of racial superiority in the form of educational segregation had become an extravagant luxury. The budgetary lunacy of segregation for west Texas schools is more clearly evident in the example of San Saba which had spent 7,500 dollars in the previous year to bus five African–American children on an a daily eighty–four mile jaunt to attend the colored school in Brady. When provided the opportunity by the Supreme Court, San Saba administrators jumped at the chance to integrate.

Segregated schools were financially feasible as long as the “equal” part of the “separate but equal” doctrine could be ignored. From the beginning, white citizens in Brownwood had at least tolerated a “colored” school in their city. It was the African – American community, however, that made educational provision for their children beginning in the late 1880s.

The only indication of white community support in nineteenth century Brownwood for the education of African – American comes from oral tradition. This account suggests that minimal financial provision for the “colored” school was haphazard and “off the books” so to speak until the beginning of the twentieth century. It was only a matter of time before the reality of separation without equality would be challenged in courts. Between 1938 and 1951, lawyers of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (N.A.A.C.P.) revealed in several court cases that African–Americans from the graduate school level down to public schools were systematically denied equal access to a quality education. During this period, federal courts began to sympathize with African–American plaintiffs asking for equalization of school facilities.

By 1949, the proverbial hand writing was on the wall. If school segregation was to be maintained, a substantial financial commitment would have to be made to “equalize” segregated schools. The Gilmer–Aiken Acts passed by the Legislature in 1949 included provisions to equalize salaries of African–American teachers, provide for more systematic funding and encourage regular school attendance. White Texans in the east, with generally larger tax bases, and much larger African–American populations, accepted the high cost for school “equalization” in order to maintain segregation. But school tax payers on the periphery of the segregationist South were somewhat less enthusiastic to preserve segregated schools at such a high cost.

Between 1949 and 1954, a marked increase in costs related to the improvement the physical plants of segregated schools combined with a concurrent decline in African–American school enrollment drove the relative cost of maintaining Hardin campus skyward. Put simply, Brownwood taxpayers would have to pay a lot of money to improve a school with declining enrollment. In 1925, the year that school segregation was formally made the law in Texas, the instructional cost per white child in Brownwood was $49.46 while only $26.20 for each student in the “colored” school. Teachers in segregated schools at this time were paid one–third less than their white counterparts and funds for buildings and supplies were similarly reduced. But by 1949, this differential had narrowed substantially – $118.40 per white student and $108.13 per student at Hardin. By 1954, because of the budgetary increases to improve segregated schools, the per capita cost for African-American students at Hardin had shot up to $244.53 while per white student lagged behind at $191.71.

The instructional cost per white child between 1949 and 1954 had increased 61% while during the same period the instructional cost for each Hardin student had increased 126%. In this five year period instructional costs at Hardin School increased 50.3 % from 18,707 dollars to 28,122 dollars.

With these numbers in mind, the Brown decision of 1954 might have been viewed by Brownwood school administrators as a gift from the Supreme Court. The Court’s decree gave Brownwood and other similar districts an excuse to ignore Texas school segregation laws that linked state funding to consistent and complete implementation of school segregation. Integration as implemented in the fall of 1955 is best viewed as a move to reduce costs through consolidation rather than an act motivated out of obedience to constitutional law or penchant for social justice.

Consolidation (integration) of Hardin School was nevertheless one small remedy to a much larger budgetary problem. The the majority white student population of Brownwood increased by 3.3% between 1949 and 1954, while the budget for white individual student instruction increased by 37.9% during the same period. The number of teachers at white schools increased 34% from 93 to 125.

On July 4, 1955, the Texas Board of Education, in response to the Supreme Court’s “all deliberate speed” directive, voted to ignore stated Texas law regarding segregation and “distribute state funds to local districts regardless of whether or not the schools are segregated or non – segregated.” Then on July 8^th, the Executive Committee of the Texas Interscholastic League voted to overturn previous rules that prohibited integrated competition. So, integrated schools would get state funding and more importantly they could continue to play football.

School districts that chose to implement integration met some powerful opposition. Governor Allan Shivers, who worked to stall the integration process said “I hope no district will dash headlong into action because of fear or pressure…I hope all districts will be fully advised and prepared before final decisions are made.” But Brownwood school officials ignored the wishes of the Governor.

At the July 25, 1955 stated meeting of the Brownwood School Board, the issue of school integration was addressed. After a “lengthy discussion,” board trustee Ernest Morris introduced a motion that: “During the school term of 1955 – 56, the high school grades (9-12, inclusive) shall be taught at Brownwood High School on a non – segregated basis.” Trustee R.M. Belcher seconded and the motion passed unanimously.

In a statement to the Brownwood Bulletin on July 27th, Superintendent King pointed out that Hardin School had a high school enrollment of twenty – five students making it “highly impractical” to provide two high school programs.”

The vast majority of Texas school districts postponed the inevitable in the summer of 1955. Some of these communities would face years of turmoil. In contrast, resolute, prompt and wise action by Superintendent King and the School Board allowed for a peaceful beginning to the integration of Brownwood schools.

Brownwood School Board Members